INTRODUCTION
The symmetric Silverman game (S, T, v) is defined as follows. Let S be a set of positive real numbers, and let T > 1, v > 0. Each of two players independently selects an element of S. The player with the larger number wins 1 from his opponent, unless his number is at least T times as large as the other, in which case he must pay the opponent v. Equal numbers draw.
The parameter T is called the threshold, and v is called the penalty. A version of this game on a special discrete set S (see the Appendix) is described in [3, p. 2121. David Silverman [lo] 
THE PAYOFF MATRIX M,
For n > 1, let M, be the 2n + 1 by 2n + 1 skew-symmetric (Toeplitz) matrix for which each entry on the first n subdiagonals below the main diagonal is 1 and each of the remaining entries below is -v. For example, Let W = E U F. Then W has k = 2n + 1 elements, which we denote by w,<w,<.** < wk. Also write w. = co = 0. Observe that W is determined by S and T, independent of v. We shall see that W is the optimal, or essential, subset of S for this T in the sense that optimal play in the It is straightforward then to verify, using (4.1) and the definitions preceding it, that the payoff matrix is precisely M,.
Write the vector V,, of Section 2 as V,,T = (vi,. . . , vk), and let r be the mixed strategy which assigns probability vi /(vi + * * . + v,) to wi, 1~ i < k.
[These components vi are positive for v > v,_r by (2.2).] We are now in a position to prove the main theorem for v > v,. 
Proof.
For b E S, denote by E(b, T) the expected payoff to player I (the row player) using the pure strategy b against player II's strategy 7. By symmetry of the game, the game value, if it exists, must be 0, so to prove the 
. . . 
ESSENTIAL PURE STRATEGIES FOR v < V"
The essential sets in Theorems 5-7 below will be obtained by augmenting the set W with two additional elements.
Several new definitions are required. With rr = deg(S, T) and W as in Section 4, let gi = (Tfi >, i = 1,2.
Here g, is defined only if n>l.
Let U={cES:e,+,<c<g,/Tl, and if U z 0 let u be the largest element of U. If U z 0, then u < g, / T < f,, so e n+1 <u < fi, and also f, cT~,+~<Tu< g,, so f,,< g,. Whether U is empty or not, f, < g, < g,. 
Proof.
The function H,(x)=(~~+2x--1~x+1)+x=x~+3~~+2~-1 is increasing for x > 0 and is zero at po, so it is positive for x > pa. For 
We first show that rr is optimal for the subgame on W,. From the definitions of U, fi, and gi, the payoff matrix G" of this subgame, shown in Table 1 , is the 2n + 3 by 2 n + 3 skew-symmetric matrix which has middle row (--v (with 1 and -1 each occurring n times) and last row (with 1 occurring n times), and which becomes M, when the middle and last rows and columns are deleted. Proof. We first show that rr is optimal for the subgame on W,. From the definitions of U, fi, and gi, the payoff matrix ii?, of this subgame, shown in Table 1 , is the 2n + 3 by 2 n + 3 skew-symmetric matrix which has middle row (-v 
an-1 an
when n = 2 and for all v 2 v,_a when n > 2. If n = 2 and S has no elements in (f,, Tu)U(g,, Tgr), then E(b, TV) = -v < 0, so TV is optimal for the full game as described in the statement of the theorem. It remains only to prove the uniqueness statement for rl. For this it suffices to show that for all v > 0, the nullity of M, is 1. Assume that for some v > 0 and n 2 1 the nullity of M, exceeds 1. Then since this nullity is odd, there is a nonzero vector U, in the null space of M, whose middle and last components are both zero. Let U,!, be the 2n + 1 by 1 vector obtained from U,, by deleting the middle and last components. The matrix obtained from M, by deleting its middle and last rows and columns is M,. Since ii?,U,, = 0, we have M,U: = 0. By (3.1) and Lemma 1, we therefore have, without loss of generality, U,!, = V,. Thus U, 0, O) , where the first blank is filled by the first n + 1 components of V, and the second by the last n components of V,. We have n REMARK. If v = 0, it is not true that 3, always has nullity 1; for example, M, has nullity 3.
THE CASES WHERE U = 0
As remarked in Section 6, we always have f,, < g, < g,, and when U = 0 equality is possible in either place, leading to three cases. When n = 1, g, is undefined, and we use h 1 = (Tg, ) in place of g,. We begin with the case of strict inequalities. Theorem 6 deals with n = 1, while Theorem 7 deals with n > 1.
THEOREM 6.
Assume that n=deg(S,T)=l, U=0, undf, <g, <h, , G, , F_, , G, , ) and W, =(e, , e, , f, , g, , h_, ) . Let 72 be the strategy which assigns probabilities to W, in proportion to Q1. Then:
(a) For cl,, < u < v~, r2 is the unique optimal strategy. Proof. We show first that r2 is optimal for the subgame on W,. The matrix ti, of this subgame is It remains only to prove the uniqueness, and this follows from the fact that a, has nullity 1 for all real V. n It remains only to prove the uniqueness statement for TV. For this, it suffices to show that for all Y > 0, the nullity of G,, is 1. It is easily checked that the nullity of G, is 1. Assume that for some n 2 2, fin_ 1 has nullity 1 but i%?,, has nullity > 1. Then there is a nonzero vector U, in the null space of &?,, whose (n + 11th and (2 n + 2)th entries are both zero. Let UL be the 2 n + 1 by 1 vector obtained from U, by deleting the (n + 11th and (2 n + 21th entries. The matrix obtained from @, by deleting the (n + 1)th and (2 n + 2)th is optimal fw v,_,<v<v,.
For v,_~<v<v, this optimal strategy is unique.
Proof.
Denote the modified strategy by P. Rename the elements of 
